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In a situation where rigid borders between states have lost some of their 
momentum and importance, there has been a certain opening for inventive 
regional integration of lower ambition than, for instance, the more all-
encompassing European Union. The emphasis has been put on region-
building in order not to challenge the nation state concept. Acceptability, 
thus, may make region-building the more viable strategy to fill the political 
vacuum that emerged after the Cold War. 
It is somewhat early for a full and extensive assessment of the region-
building strategy. Nevertheless, some experimental projects, involving 
territories on both sides of the former East-West division, have indeed 
occurred in the immediate aftermath of the downfall of the iron curtain. 
They include among others the Vizegrad initiative,' the Mitteleuropa 
concept, the Baltic Sea Cooperation, and the Barents Region initiative. 
This study will focus on the Barents Region initiative, which was 
launched by Norway's Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg in January 
1992. Although the first vague moves in order to seek a closer relationship 
to the Russians in the north were made much earlier, eg between Finnmark 
and Murmansk in 1986 and between Finnmark and Archangel in 1990. The 
County of Nordland even approached the giant city of St. Petersburg (with 
five million inhabitants) to make an agreement during this period of the 
great wave of change in the East. 
The cooperation in the Barents Region has followed a two-step course. 
The formal cooperation started in Troms0 in the County of Troms on 25 
April 1992 by the signing of a protocol where five counties- Murmansk 
and Archangel in Russia along with Nordland, Troms and Finnmark in 
Norway- agreed to form a regional cooperation among themselves. The 
second step was made when Finnish Lappland and Swedish Norrbotten 
joined at the conference in Kirkenes in January 1993. 
Mainly because of strong pressure from Finland, the Autonomous 
Republic of Karelia was also given an option to enter the regional net-
work, 2 and was able to become a full member on 22 April 1993 when the 
other members conceded to the Finnish and Russian views and endorsed 
the enlargement of the region. Karelia enjoys an extended self-government 
compared to the other two Russian counties and makes more decisions on 
its own account. Consequently, this particular actor saves a lot of precious 
time, and could possibly serve as <<the engine» on the Russian side.' 
The eight sub-state administrative areas that participate are the core 
Barents Region; the greater Barents Region, comprising all the members of 
the Barents Council, is a looser geographic entity which is not included in 
the Barents Region concept of this thesis. 
The study deals with the following questions: How did the Barents 
Region concept come into being? Why did the Barents project origin as a 
Norwegian political initiative although there were several other capable 
regional actors involved on the same scene? What are the potentials of the 
Barents Region in a broader European framework? 
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Why did Norway ~aUJnch its !Barents 
Region Initiative? 
A Change of Climate 
Ever since Norway joined NATO in 1949, Norwegian foreign policy has 
been a rather stable affair based on the North Atlantic security reassurance. 
In the characteristic political climate of the Cold War, the static business of 
foreign policy was taken care of by a few, trusted men in Oslo. One reason 
was the need and wish to keep certain parts ofthe security and defence 
policies, particularly intelligence matters, away from annoying public 
notice. Apart from this, the main foreign policy line of the Labour Party 
governments (with hard-line members of the cabinet like Halvard Lange 
and Jens Christian Hauge) did, at least in the later periods, receive the 
support of a clear majority both in parliament and in the population. The 
demand for a broad foreign or security policy debate was contained to the 
left wing of the political landscape. 
Over the years both political and military strategies changed, but not to 
the extent that the founding principles of foreign policy had to be revised. 
The first fundamental change arrived on the scene when Mikhail S. 
Gorbachev initiated the reform processes in the USSR. The new and 
warmer winds that increasingly carne blowing in from the east, did not 
merely change their places of origin, but also fostered inspiration for the 
West European countries. As the iron curtain disappeared, the need for a 
response on the northern flank became apparent. One of the first reactions 
to the historic opening of the East-West borders was the drive towards 
regionalization in northern Europe. In Norway, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was the first government institution where such thoughts were 
manifested. The Barents project, which later resulted in a political region, 
was the contribution of Norwegian foreign policy to the challenges of 
creating cooperation across the old East-West divide. 
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Regional Stability based on Modern Security Concerns 
The more home-grown, less altruistic, argument for launching the Barents 
Region, was the fact that the unstable political and ecological situation in 
north western Russia represented a threat to Norwegian security. Although 
security policies are not discussed within the frameworks of the Barents 
Region, the development of mutual trust offers an important security-
building endowment to a formerly extremely tense area.' This is not to say 
that the asymmetrical relation between a small state, Norway, and a great 
power, Russia, is not a source of distress. 
The Russian Northern Fleet is still more or less intact although the sea 
training and operative activity do not follow the old, more active pattern. 
Its nuclear strike capabilities are, technically speaking, unchanged although 
maintenance is increasingly becoming poorer. Moreover, few are willing to 
rule out a nationalist takeover in Russia. Needless to say, the economic 
situation in the former eastern block also threatens the stability of the 
Nordic area. 
Ever since environmental concerns and green values ehtered the politi-
cal arena in the 1970s, the concept of security and stability has been used 
by pressure groups outside the traditional military-industrial complex. The 
safety of a state and the future of its people would clearly be threatened by 
an ecological catastrophe. In parts of the Barents Region air, soil and water 
are endangered by misuse and lack of regime-building as well as the 
absence of financial sources to clean up what is already damaged or 
destroyed. Post-Cold War international relations with less emphasis on 
military capacity, are best explained using the extended security concept, 
which embodies not only military concerns, but allows for ecological, 
economic and other relevant considerations. 
Under certain conditions, bad management of nuclear plants and atomic 
waste material might actually lead to a nuclear disaster of Chemobyl 
proportions. The people of northern Norway and many regional politicians 
are beginning to understand the looming environmental problems - as 
manifested by the direct action of "Stop the Death Clouds from the East". 
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Undoubtedly, a new environmental consciousness, which is closely linked 
to the preservation of regional stability, is on the offensive also in the 
Barents Region. 
Environmental Problems in the Barents Region 
It is beyond the limits of this study to describe in detail all the ecological 
problems of the highly industrialized parts of the Kola Peninsula. Accord-
ingly, the focus will be set on the single factor that represents the heaviest 
threat to the regional stability, namely nuclear waste. The nuclear pollution 
in Murmansk oblast is of such immense proportions that help from outside 
the Barents Region has to be sought. The confrontation between two 
competing society models, the military-strategic role of the high north and 
the following militarization has resulted in an environmental catastrophe. 
Russia and the Nordic countries have since 1988 gradually established 
bilateral cooperation programmes and agreements to fight the mutual 
problems.' 
In 1993 there were 220 nuclear reactors at work in Murmansk County.' 
The number has declined lately from a total of270 in 1989-90. Still, 
considering the many Russian accidents, especially with submarines ( eg 
Komsomolets in 1989) and dumping at sea, the picture turns out to be a 
rather grave one. Furthermore, the exploitation of oil and gas at sea in the 
region represents another threat to the environment: The planned building 
of gas producing platforms at the Shtokmanovskoye field in the Barents 
Sea by the inexperienced company Rossjelf (in stead of Norsk Hydro as 
projected) further endangers the regional ocean life.' Waste material from 
mines and metal industry also contributes to reduce the ecological stability 
not only in Murmansk, but in other regional counties as well. The only 
positive short term effect of this situation is that it offers business opportu-
nities for companies which have the technology to cope with the ecological 
challenges. 8 Often, however, the state does the job itself as it is planning to 
do with the storage depot for nuclear waste on Novaya Zemlya. 
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One of the 13 I Russian nuclear devices tested since 1957 exploded on 
the northern island ofNovaya Zemlya on 24 October I 990.9 It was the last 
nuclear explosion on former Soviet soil. The two main islands ofNovaya 
Zemlya were probably chosen as test sites because of low population 
density. The only people living there- the Nenets- were moved south in 
1954, prior to the first tests." Yet, the Semipalatinsk area in Kasakhstan 
was used more frequently, and since I 963, "only" 42 underground tests 
have been conducted on Novaya Zemlya. Regrettably, the relatively low 
number of explosions does not reflect the amount of nuclear material 
involved. The devices used at Novaya Zemlya were bigger and accounted 
for 94 percent of the Soviet total. 
Another problem is the climatic conditions on the Arctic islands. The 
permafrost layer creates risks of soil fractures after an explosion, causing 
radioactive water to leek into the Barents Sea. Unfortunately, the 
Matochkin Shar test site on Novaya Zemlya is the only one left within 
Russian borders after the secession of the former Soviet republics. A test 
ban has been in force since March I 990, but President Boris Yeltsin is 
under pressure from the military to authorize a resumption of the testing. 
This may weli be one of the greatest threats to the regional stability in the 
1990s. 
In order to provide efficient storage of the nuclear material, a satisfac-
tory site has been spotted by the Moscow authorities on Novaya Zemlya. 
The local government in Archangel disagrees, and refuses to handle the 
waste material from the neighbouring Murmansk county. In the end, 
military officials are to decide as military rule has been reinstalled on the 
islands.U Undoubtedly, there is an urgent need for western expertise and 
funding. Too many reactors have over the years been dumped in the sea or 
temporarily stored on the ship Lepse in a harbour just outside the city of 
Murmansk.12 
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How ttne Barents Region was 
established 
The Internal Foreign Office Debate13 
The new opening for untraditional foreign policy after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall had consequences also in the Norwegian foreign ministry. This was 
particularly apparent in the Department of Policy Planning and Research, 
which is supposed to be the source of undogmatic initiatives. After Assist-
ant Director General Sverre Jervell (of the Department of Policy Planning 
and Research) returned to the ministry after a year of research mostly on a 
project about the Baltic Sea Cooperation at the Norwegian Institute of 
Foreign Affairs, the idea of a Barents Region was brought to the ministry 
itself. The Department of Policy Planning and Research continued to work 
on the conceptual structure of a region in the north, and the FridtjofNansen 
Institute was given the task to produce some seven reports on the proposed 
BaJallsReg:i:n!' After having the idea presented to him through a two-
hour overhead show," Foreign Minister Stoltenberg became very enthusi-
astic. Aiming at defining the future playing rules in the high north while 
Moscow was talkative and positive, a small group of senior ministerial 
officials16 met at the Holmenkollen Park Hotel to discuss the political 
concept of the region. Evidently, the Barents project was conducted and 
promoted on a relatively independent basis in the early stages, detached 
from the ordinary hierarchical line of administration in the ministry. A 
small group of people took care of most of the communication .with foreign 
embassies including meetings and lunches to prepare the Kirkenes confer-
ence. All along, there was close informal contact with the Russian embassy 
in Oslo. 
Certain aspects of the Barents Initiative faced intradepartmental critic. 
Some advocated a more cautious attitude towards Russia; as to the admin-
istrative concept of the region, some of these more cautious diplomats 
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wanted the state's representative in each county (JY/kesmannen) to play the 
leading part in the Regional Council in stead of elected local representa-
tives, in order to maintain and protect the centre's control of foreign policy. 
The foreign minister himself, however, was very much in favour. He 
put a lot of prestige in the Barents idea, and, subsequently, a great deal of 
pressure on the ambassadorial establishment of the ministry. The idea of a 
region up north was also tested on central members of the government." In 
due time, the initiative also got clearance from the prime minister and the 
government. Furthermore, some parts of the ministerial bureaucracy, eg the 
Eastern European Office, supported the Barents idea from the start. The 
enthusiastic - almost explosive - welcoming and support of the idea in 
Northern Norway" also contributed significantly to the cause. Preliminary 
talks with Andrei Kozyrev in March 1992 disclosed great interest on behalf 
of the Russians. Without his positive response the Barents idea would 
probably have been dropped without ever receiving publicity." On surpris-
ingly short notice Boris Yeltsin also approved of the formation of a Barents 
Region in his speech at the Helsinki CSCE conference in June I 992. The 
United States government also declared its support of the Barents Region 
although it did not sign the Kirkenes Declaration." 
From Ad hoc to Standard Lines of Command 
In its early phases the daily work on the Barents efforts within the ministry 
was not systematized according to normal bureaucratic procedures. Mainly 
because of the initial lack of backing from centrally positioned civil serv-
ants, one had to undertake most ofthe early work at the political level of 
the ministry." On two occasions a governmental paper (regjeringsnotat) 
was produced by the minister's secretariat. Apart from this involvement, 
the Department of Policy Planning and Research played a major role in the 
practical preparations for the Kirkenes meeting and later Barents tasks. 
This particular way of handling the Barents question, outside the normal 
routine lines and rules, had an upsetting effect on the bureaucracy, and the 
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need for a formalized departmental structure intensified. As a result a 
working group was established: twelve to fifteen people from different 
relevant offices and departments had weekly meetings dealing with Barents 
questions. After a while a Barents secretariat, consisting of two employees 
was set up to take care of the daily work. In due course (ie spring 1993) the 
interdepartmental working group was used to coordinate the progress of the 
project. After the conference in Kirkenes the Barents project was fully 
integrated in the normal bureaucratic procedures of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and from March 1993 Mr Klepsvik became Stoltenberg's right 
hand as far as the Barents Region was concerned. By then, the bureaucratic 
procedures were normalized in terms of instruction lines, and the Barents 
Region was no longer a controversial issue in the ministry nor for the new 
minister, Mr Johan Jorgen Holst, even though the latter perhaps played the 
Barents project somewhat down in favour of a broader engagement to-
wards Russia. 
The Position of Parliament 
The reception of the Kirkenes Declaration was in general very positive in 
all political parties. Inquiring questions to the foreign minister was pre-
sented on one occasion only by the foreign policy spokesman of the Left 
Socialist Party (LSP), Mr Paul Chaffey, where he was asking about the 
local influence on the proceedings of the Barents Region." Some other 
representatives made a few comments on a smaller, more limited scale. Mr 
FritjofFrank Gundersen of the Progress Party pointed out the danger of 
enlarging the bureaucracy by developing a Barents Region. MPs Ingvald 
Godal of the Conservative Party and Reidar Johansen (LSP) respectively 
favoured the support of the Baltic states in stead of pumping money into 
north western Russia and called the whole thing a flop." This notwith-
standing, the response was genuinely a positive one. 
The governing Labour Party played an important role in gaining parlia-
mentary support for the Barents project. All contacts to the parliament were 
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infonnal until the region was officially established in January 1993. Never-
theless, some Labour MPs, including the vice president of parliament, 
being at the same time Labour's Nordic coordinator, were infonned in 
advance. Later Mr Jervell met with the parliamentary group of the Labour 
Party for a briefing. The party's International Committee was also in-
fanned at an early stage. 
Two successive parliamentary propositions (1992 and 1993)24 laid the 
economic foundation for the cooperation. Due to an intervention by the 
political secretariat of Foreign Minister Stoltenberg, the priority on north 
western Russia was laid down on the very first page. 
The Barents Region displays a new linkage between foreign and 
domestic politics. The initiative allows regional politicians to have a say 
and raise the prospects of mobilization and vitalization of Norwegian 
foreign policy. The long tenn effect of this could increase the responsibili-
ties of parliament in the making of foreign policy. 
Apparently, the Starting did not play any central role in building the 
Barents Region. Representatives of foreign states were consulted long 
before the Norwegian parliament got the chance to utter its opinion. 
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Previous Attempts at Cooperation in the 
Northern Hemisphere 
Naturally, problems of regional stability have been addressed earlier by 
other regional initiatives than the Barents Region. Even though the Barents 
project is the one with the strongest base in terms of institutional coopera-
tion, it is useful to have a glance at some of the other regime-oriented 
strategies in order to get the entire picture of potential shortcomings and of 
what is going on parallel to the Barents Region. 
Inspired by General Secretary Gorbachev's "Murmansk initiative" on I 
October 1987, the Canadians launched the idea of an Arctic region by 
proposing an Arctic Council modelled on the Nordic Council." Prime 
Minister B. Mulroney made the suggestion when he met with President 
Yeltsin to sign an environmental protocol on I February 1992.26 So far 
success has been limited. 
Several NGOs have been very active. The Inuit Circumpolar Confer-
ence, campaigning for an Arctic nuclear weapons-free zone, and the 
International Arctic Science Committee (IASC),working with science, are 
both examples of such activity. The latter was involved in the establish-
ment of the Rovaniemi process (see further below) which was to deal with 
environmental issues. In the proposed Arctic region framework the inten-
tion was to include both indigenous peoples' requests and the Rovaniemi 
environmental complex. 
The Rovaniemi Jntergovermnental Forum on Arctic Environmental 
Issues is, as the name indicates, a Finnish initiative. The same eight coun-
tries as in the case of the Arctic Council, which was proposed later, partici-
pates: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, 
Sweden and the USA. On top of the agenda figures the sensitive Arctic 
environment. The forum works through ordinary research and registration 
of environmental dangers through the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
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Programme." Both the IASC and the Rovaniemi concepts are exclusively 
focused on the Arctic. Also non-Arctic states with considerable interests in 
the Arctic are included in the IASC (France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Japan, The Netherlands). 
Regionalization - A New Approach to Cooperation 
In comparison with the initiatives mentioned above, the Barents Region is less 
exclusively Arctic, and concentrates on a smaller, more focused geographic 
area. The smaller area is compensated by a deeper institutionalization. 
The regional projects of the I 990s are seldom constructed around an ethnic 
core or aspiring nation. Instead they emphasize cross-national affinities among 
nations that remain different from one another- and from other peoples in 
other parts of the nation-states to which they belong themselves"· One 
advantage is that inter-state regions are not felt by the nation-states to be 
disturbingly binding. 
According to the current regional planning paradigm," one can point out 
three main categories of regions: There are the administrative, the functional, 
and the identity regions. Since the Barents Region is not a region within the 
borders of one state, it is definitely not a separate administrative region. It 
actually comprises eight administrative intra-state regions; one republic and 
seven counties. The cooperation is built on limited fields of common interest, 
and is consequently primarily ajimctiona/ region, although not a full-scale 
one. In a way the Barents Region is a Ia carte based, limited to specific cases 
of cooperation where any state may participate at least in the greater regional 
context; ie become members of the Barents Council if not the Regional 
Council. The Barents Region is also an aspiring identity region because of 
common history and cultural contacts. All three regional concepts involve the 
idea of decentralised power and responsibility - or even further European 
integration." A combination of(overlapping) concepts might strengthen the 
region and improve its chances of success." 
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Institutions of the Barents Region 
Undoubtedly, the Barents Region cannot display the same degree of 
structured regional institutions as, for example, the EU or the UN. Perhaps 
is the need for a detailed governing mechanism neither so great, nor so 
realistic as is the case for other similar regional projects. 
After Stoltenberg had presented his speech in Rovaniemi on 21 October 
1992, it became clear to all potential future participants that the planned 
region was to consist of two pillars: one regionally anchored, dealing with 
popular legitimization; and one state controlled, addressing resource 
management. The Regional Council organize cooperation on county level 
whereas the Barents Council deals with cooperation among states. This is 
not the situation for other regional projects in the northern hemisphere such 
as, for example, the Baltic Sea Cooperation or the Nordic Council. After 
the establishment of the unique Regional Council in the Barents Region, an 
entirely new trend surfaced. Until then, sovereign states had only rarely 
accepted or allowed any of their frontier counties to involve themselves in 
direct interaction and joint ruling bodies with counties of foreign states. 
The main argument for the dual institutional structure, is that problems of 
various types have to be solved at different levels and with different kinds 
of authority. 
One of the factors lacking in keeping up the drive of the process at this 
stage in the Barents institutional context, is the presence of a parliamentary 
assembly. This could in fact be compared to what several scholars, as well 
as committed politicians, view as the so-called "democratic deficit" that 
one can clearly distinguish within the EU power structure. Because of this 
political gap, regionalism could run the risk of running out of "popular 
fuel" unless one has some kind of parliament arrangement, with direct 
elections to go along with it, when the time is ripe32 If the wish of the elites 
for a viable and active region is to be fulfilled, the democratic element must 
be strengthened by the foundation of a Barents Parliament in order to 
gather the people behind the political slogans of the Barents initiative. 
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The Regional Council - County Level Structure 
In the words of Foreign Minister J. J. Holst at the subregional meeting of 
the Baltic Sea Cooperation, Stavanger, 7 October 1993: 
... it is already clear that the work of the [Regional] Council will be the 
real generator behind the development of cooperation in the Barents 
Region. 
For what purpose, then, did the state authorities wish- or dare for that 
matter - to delegate power in such remarkable amounts to regional, sub-
state actors? Firstly, the threat and fear from the atmosphere of the Cold 
War were either subdued or had completely vanished. The Barents Council 
is intended to be a source of engagement, motivation and ideas. Exchange 
of experience, know-how, and the entire process of learning in a wider 
framework than five years ago all represent vital sectors where mutual 
efforts combined with sufficient prudence offer a promising alternative 
road, less travelled by. 
Yet another innovation in the process of regional cooperation on a 
trans-border basis was the announcement (in the Regional Council's 
constituting protocol signed in Kirkenes) that a representative from the 
indigenous Sami people was to be seated in the Council. This representa-
tive is elected by the Nordic Sami Council, which includes the Kola Sami 
Organization. It is the first time that this group takes part in a political body 
which engages participants from the other nations in the region in a trans-
border structure. Not even in the North Calotte Committee does the Sami 
people have any representation. Since the indigenous peoples were invited 
as observers to the Rovaniemi process, it was expected that the same 
concept should be applied to the Barents Region, but after consulting the 
Nordic Sarni Council, the Norwegian Foreign Office decided to give the 
Sami full representation in the Regional Council. In spite of the right to 
equal representation in the Regional Council, the president of the Sami 
parliament in Norway, Mr 0. H. Magga, expressed some disappointment 
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on behalf of his people. In his opinion, the Sami people should be repre-
sented even in the trans-state Barents Council, a claim presented by the 
largest Sami political party, The Norwegian Sami Association (Norske 
Somers Riksforbund)." This attitude is assessed as completely unrealistic 
by the other state and regional actors, particularly because some Sami 
people wanted even one Sami representative from each member state 
which would effectively lead to a Regional Council consisting of four Sami 
representatives and only nine from the other four nations. 
The most interesting element in the political apparatus of the Barents 
Region is, however, the fact that a regional council exists at all. When the 
new regional initiative in the Baltic was institutionalized in March I 992, 
there was no such thing as a regional council on its agenda because it was 
simply thought to be too daring to relinquish "pieces of sovereignty" to 
sub-state actors. The legitimizing effect of a regional political body ought 
to be extraordinary, and its origins are probably to be found in the constant 
ever-lasting problems of revitalizing the Norwegian periphery as well as 
containing and avoiding the spread of unsuitability in the East. 
The traditional inter-governmental way of cooperating is, of course, 
important also in the case of the Barents Region. In the Kirkenes Declara-
tion the main achievement in terms of institutionalizing at the state level 
was the agreement on a so-called Barents Council, which was to take care 
of high-level political connections. A regular yearly meeting of the foreign 
ministers was written into the common statement that came out of the 
conference. In addition other ministers have the right, which they are 
encouraged to use, to meet according to the relevance of the issues at hand. 
So far scheduled meetings have included the ministers of culture and 
transportation. These meetings took place in respectively Kirkenes and 
Alta during the autumn of 1993. 
Intentionally, the Barents Council is first and foremost meant to per-
form a coordinating function vis-a-vis the Regional Council, and only 
interfere if it is necessary to guide the counties' strategies from the state 
capitals (eg in financial questions). Otherwise the subsumed Regional 
Council is to be left strictly alone in its initiatives and decision-
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making processes to avoid losing regional development momentum. 
Certain parallels to the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty 
might be visible in the shadows of this functional separation of political 
administration: The central governments should - apart from its continuous 
administrative backing and responsibility on a daily basis -act only ifthere 
is a substantial and sufficient need for overlaying coordination work at the 
inter-county level. Another feature of the Barents Region's institutional 
structure is the association with the EU arrangements where the Council of 
Ministers plays the role of the Barents Council, and the Committee of the 
Regions might be compared to the Regional Council. The comparison may 
seem a bit far-fetched," but any visible similarities could prove to be very 
helpful when one considers the possibility of EU funding and coordination. 
(To be discussed in greater detail later.) 
State or County Authority Basis? 
At first sight, the Barents Council seems to be the arena where the real 
power is to be located. On the other hand, the comer stone of Foreign 
Minister Stoltenberg's Barents agenda was a decentralized power structure 
so that the Regional Council would have the de facto means at its disposal 
to encourage the expected flood oflocal initiatives once it was in operation. 
If the Regional Council is essential in identifying fields of common interest 
and launching initiatives, the Barents Council is in control when it comes 
to funding. Implementation is very dependent on the Regional Council. In 
the end, both bodies are needed to achieve the most advantageous result. 
The distribution of power is of less interest. Since the chairmanship of the 
Regional Council alternates at two-year intervals and the Barents Council's 
chair rotates every year, continuity is better protected at the regional than at 
the state level. 
In short, the Barents institutions are characterized by their function as a 
political meeting place where no sharp divisions are prevalent between the 
administrative levels. Since there is effectively no right of veto, but rather a 
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consensus mechanism that reigns in the Barents Region institutions," the 
tricky question of sovereignty loss, which arises in tight regional 
cooperations, is no indomitable hindrance. The different states' need to 
protect their national sovereignty is not limited by the specific requirements 
of the Barents institutions. On the intra-state level, however, conflicts of 
competence may occur between central and regional bureaucracy. 
Administrative Differences among the Member States 
In Sweden, Norway and, perhaps even more, in Finland the state has 
always been rather centralized. Over the years this system has undergone a 
slow liberalization, and lower levels of government have increased their 
power. In the mid seventies, Norwegian counties (folkeskommuner) were 
given extensive and increased authority, direct elections (1975) and tax 
revenues ( 1977). 
The Russian administrative system is at the moment riddled by the same 
problems as Russia in general. Especially after the unsuccessful coup d'etat 
of August 1991, the struggle for power in Moscow between Parliament 
with its former chairman, Ruslan Khasbulatov, and President Boris Yeltsin 
intensified. The rivalry and competence conflict certainly provide - and still 
have - their parallels at the county level in Murmansk, Archangel and 
Karelia. It is very difficult, indeed, to rule a county where there is one 
governor, one local soviet, and one representative of the president, who 
struggle for power and influence at the expense of the other actors." In 
contrast to the situation in the Nordic states, the appointed representative is 
responsible for the Barents Region. Additional problems stem from old 
habits; in Russia everyone was used to more clearly defined political and 
administrative channels. Doubt about who was to give orders and who was 
to obey was virtually non-existent before the turbulent change of climate in 
the East. 
Apart from well-known political disagreements based on incompatible 
economic programmes and the scarcity of financial funds, the obsolescence 
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of military rule in some areas in the Russian part of the region 
(Severodvinsk, Severomorsk etc.), has proved to be a problem in the 
cooperation." 
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lhe !Barents Re~iocm as re~ated to Cllther 
Aspects off Nmwe~ian forei~n Policy 
Three circles have dominated Norwegian foreign policy since World War 
II: The Atlantic, the European and the Nordic dimensions have all influ-
enced Norway's relation to foreign powers, but "She has doggedly refused 
to choose between them, but rather attempted to orchestrate, reconcile and 
mediate the competing perspectives and interests involved"". To each of 
these three political directions a certain Norwegian fear of marginalization 
may be detected. 
The reduction of Norway's very strong Atlantic connection to the USA 
originates from the fact that the focus ofNA TO strategic interests has 
moved from confrontation in the Arctic to cooperation farther south. On 
the European scene the Western European Union (WEU) aspires to take 
over some ofNATO's coordinating function. In the Nordic context the 
Baltic Sea region has left the Nordic Council with a less important role 
both in terms of the number of members and the degree of European 
connections. Still this is room for manoeuvre. There is no reason to look at 
the Barents Region as part of a zero sum game where one alternative 
excludes the other. But in order to safeguard national security interests in 
the future, Norway must pay sufficient attention to all three of the men-
tioned aspects, not merely the Atlantic pillar. 
The Role of NATO and Russia as Potential Antagonists 
The Russian military capabilities in Norway's vicinity are still of signifi-
cant size. At the same time NATO's interest of and presence in the area is 
decreasing. The destabilizing impact of the NATO-Russia military rivalry 
in the region is definitely not as great as it used to be. Russians, by now, 
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distinguish their relations to the near abroad and other countries. The near 
abroad, ie the CIS, dominate Russian security concerns, the Barents Region 
is not directly involved in this relatively unstable part of Russian foreign 
policy. Furthermore, most Russian weapons and installations in the Barents 
Region are considered to be integral to the strategic balance with the USA. 
Thus, the forces stationed in the area are often seen as being above the 
local and regional context." The new attitude of central foreign policy 
actors in Moscow, stressing that they look upon the NATO countries as 
friends and partners and expressing a wish to free Europe from the heritage 
ofthe Cold War, helps create stability." 
On the other hand the existence of Russian strategic forces influences 
the regional stability since, in contrast to the navy in the Black Sea and 
Baltic Sea, they do not have to pass through narrow straits to be operative. 
Their vast numbers also contribute to the asymmetrical regional power 
structure, and effectively the stability is endangered. Only because of the 
political thaw between east and west, the situation is very much under 
control. Norwegian authorities seem to react to this improvement by 
"benign neglect",41 while emphasizing that there is no reason to respond in 
the same demonstrating way as before. Lying in the periphery has also 
been an advantage in terms of guarding regional stability. 
The Impact of the Western European Union 
Norway is an associated member of the WEU. For a long time the alliance 
lived in the shadows ofNA TO, but at a ministerial meeting in Rome in 
1984 the organization was revitalized to strengthen EU security policy and 
the European pillar of NATO. Political forces in Russia view the Barents 
Region as "a window to the West" in general, and to the EU in particular. 
This opening to the West is essential to attract sufficient capital and tech-
nology to improve, for example, the environmental security. In order to 
safeguard and stabilize economic contact with western states, military 
security and stability must be treated as a prerequisite. It is likely that the 
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Russians prefer the European WEU to the Atlantic NATO to play the main 
defence role in Western Europe in the future, since that would keep the 
Americans at a comfortable distance. Another factor which draws increas-
ing attention to the WEU, is that the American forces in Europe are reduc-
ing their numbers drastically. 
The WEU, by now, enjoys a kind of sub-EU authority on the security 
arena." Since security motivations were so strong in the process that led to 
the Barents Region, and Russia is orienting her economy in the general 
direction of Europe, the WEU has, indeed, a potential of influencing the 
Barents states. Finland is particularly vulnerable to such a development. 
Finnish national security will always be more or less a function of the 
situation in Russia. On the other hand an up-grading of the WEU is prob-
ably easier to accept for Russia than a Europeanization ofNA TO. 
The Effect of Nordic Relations 
The relations among the Nordic states have been peaceful and sincere 
throughout the Cold War, and Nordic foreign policies have even been 
coordinated in some cases, particularly concerning connections to distant 
parts of the world.'' After the changes in the Soviet Union/Russia, Nordic 
low tension policy was replaced by an extended security policy which 
includes the Baltic and Barents Regions." The problem is that the relative 
strategic importance of the Barents area is greater to Norway than to any 
other state. To handle inter-Nordic relations, it is essential for the Norwe-
gians to meet that challenge without discriminating any of the available 
options too much. 
Finland is in no position to take advantage of the reduced influence of 
Russia; eg border revisions are out of the question. Regional solutions, 
where Karelia and Pechenga (Petsamo) are included, are nevertheless 
warmly welcomed. Between the Finnish and Norwegian governments there 
are now only minor differences of opinions, but it is well known that the 
Finns were thinking about a similar project in the high north just as Nor-
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way set out to create the Barents institutions. 45 Most differences of opinion 
stem from the wish of both parties to act as <<the primary gate to the West>> 
for Russian interests." The Finnish government has always regarded itself 
as the main Nordic contact to the USSR/Russia,'' and was probably taken 
by surprise when Foreign Minister Stoltenberg all of a sudden introduced 
the idea about a northern region. All the same, Finnish wishes to include 
Karelia in the region has now come true, and, despite some difficulties in 
the past, Norway's relations to Finland are just as friendly as they have 
been for decades. After the social democratic candidate won the presiden-
tial election the political channels between Nordic social democrats may 
also be exploited to promote the Barents cause. 
A quite significant Swedish-Norwegian obstacle concerning the region, 
is the fact that Sweden is much more geared towards the Baltic Region than 
her western neighbour." Sweden, with her traditional strong bonds to 
Germany and the south, has proved to be more interested in the Baltic Sea 
Region than, for example, an all-encompassing Barents variant. The 
Swedish government regards the state's size and pivotal role in Norden as 
one of the most important features in the Nordic-European perspective." 
Sweden finds her central position in the Baltic area closer to the continent 
to be serving Swedish interests better than the Barents project. One should 
also keep in mind that Sweden does not have any access to the Barents Sea. 
Thus, much of the point about hanging on for possible future economic 
advantages is neither imperative nor very promising. In other words, the 
Barents Region is not a matter of the highest priority for Sweden. How-
ever, as Sweden considers herself the leading Nordic country, she has also 
kep\ a keen eye on Barents affairs. 
Both Denmark and Iceland are states that, with the exception of some 
fishery clashes, have few direct interests in the Barents Region. Norway's 
foreign policy relations to them are, therefore, not so relevant as for the 
other two (Finland, Sweden) in this particular case. 
To build a stable political situation in Norden, the Nordic states have 
sought to diminish the consequences of the Cold War by a "secret alliance" 
between the bridgehead of the sea power and the deference zone of the 
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continental power.50 Prudent assessment of possibilities and limitations has 
always signified the foreign policy environment in the Nordic countries. 
Moreover, as it is emphasized throughout the thesis, the compatibility of 
the different regional projects in northern Europe is not the biggest prob-
lem. Regions can be knitted together in more or less overlapping and 
adjoining structures (eg sub-regions, dual membership etc.) so that con-
flicts are avoided. Since the Nordic relations are exceptionally smooth (to 
such an extent that the rest of the world due to lack of conflict is likely to 
forget about Norden), there are few hindrances to be seen ahead. The main 
difficulties lie in finding capital for the enormous investments that are 
needed to create a viable Barents Region. 
The Arctic Dimension and the Barents Sea 
The unsolved sovereignty questions of the Barents Sea and its future 
implications offers interesting solution alternatives, particularly in a 
regional perspective: If the ocean beyond the Murmansk coast is included 
in the Barents Region at a later stage, new and vital resources are included 
on the regional agenda. Exploitation of oil and gas as well as the building 
of petroleum refineries are central issues in that context. A broader fisher-
ies' management in the Barents Sea, which is now ruled on a predomi-
nantly Russian-Norwegian bilateral regime basis, is one of the possible 
outcomes of a widened maritime Barents Region. The reason why the 
Barents Region is entirely land - and not also water - based can be found in 
the still unsolved jurisdiction dispute between Russia and Norway. The 
circumstances and implications may change fundamentally if- and when-
the unresolved question about the sea border is finally fixed. 
The single most destabilizing factor in the vicinity of the Barents 
Region is the bilateral conflict of interests regarding the borderline in the 
Barents Sea. In 1967 Norway proposed negotiations with the Soviet-
Russians in order to obtain a clearly defined border between the two 
countries. Negotiations started in 1974 and the parties signed a temporary 
DEFENCE STUDIES 2/1995 27 
agreement on 11 January 1978, regulating the fisheries in the so-called 
Grey Zone. The parties could not agree on a final delimitation line in the 
Barents Sea, and the Grey Zone was mainly set up to enable the coastal 
guard of both states to control the fishery. The agreement has been renewed 
annually over the last two decades. One has not managed to reach a final 
solution on whether the border should follow the sector line (Russian 
position), the median line (Norwegian position), or, more likely, a compro-
mise between the two. 51 The negotiations have been dragging on ever since 
Mr J. Evensen and Mr A. Treholt made their first efforts to find a perma-
nent arrangement for the disputed area, covering !55 000 square kilometres 
(II percent) of the Barents Sea.52 Recently, nationalist sentiments among 
Russian politicians have obstructed the process that seemed to be near a 
breakthrough only a couple of years ago." The unresolved questions 
involve only 16 percent of the border, the section closest to the land 
territories and the Varanger Fjord. As for 2/3 of the distance, the problems 
were solved in March 1991, but since then, progress has been slow." At 
any rate it is hard to see which assessment, political or economic, that is the 
more important to the Barents Sea states. There is, however, reason to 
believe that the establishment of the Barents Region might have a positive 
spillover effect to the troubled situation at sea. Anyway, the situation of 
undefined borders is not a new one in the history of Russian-Norwegian 
relations. Until 1826 the Pasvik border was more like a vague frontier." 
"The Loophole", a 62 400 square kilometres area of high seas in the 
Barents Sea that no state claims, is not affected by any sovereignty dispute, 
and is for the time being merely interesting as a growth area of the Arctic 
cod stock. This international area may be integrated in a common fishery 
regime (eg based on the extensive Norwegian regional experiences) with 
the rest of the Barents Sea. 
The status of the ocean areas in the far north have yet to be juridically 
defined. International law in general and the UN Conventions on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) contain outlines for the procedures which have to be 
followed to obtain a lasting solution to the disagreements on who should 
have the right to natural resources in the area. Especially the zone around 
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the Svalbard archipelago is controversial because of the special provisions 
for foreign commercial activities laid down in the Svalbard Treaty. Norway 
insists on exclusive rights to the continental shelf which is seen only as an 
extension of the mainland (Finnmark) one. 
Both the northern and the southern dimensions of the Euro-Arctic 
Barents Region are strong and significant, but at least on a short-term basis 
the European link is the most promising one. If the southern connection is 
given time to develop properly, the northern link, too, has greater chances 
of receiving the necessary technological and financial support so that the 
competition between the two dimensions will not lead to alienation or one 
excelling the other. 
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The economic potential of a solid linkage between Europe and the Arctic 
lies in the coordination of the enormous Arctic natural resources and 
Central European capital and technology. Ten out of twelve million people 
inhabiting the circumpolar area live in Russia, and with growing stability, 
the Russian work force may in the end provide inexpensive labour re-
sources. 56 
Even without a strengthened European link the Barents Region was not 
likely to lose all importance; The combination of technologically advanced 
Nordic countries in proximity to Russian natural resources are nevertheless 
interesting. 57 Especially for the Russians, the viability of the region will not 
totally diminish even if the region does not turn out to be «the window 
towards the west>>, which they envisaged at the start. 
It is significant that the Commission has ratified the Kirkenes Declara-
tion before any of the core Barents states were members of the Union. The 
Oslo delegation of the European Commission was very active in advocat-
ing the role of the Barents Region among the commissioners." It would be 
a signal of increasing EU interest if a commissioner (in stead of an ambas-
sador which is the case now) announces a wish to be present at a Barents 
Council meeting. Today the Barents Region is not an issue of high priority 
for the EU. 
Market Economy in the East and Western Investments 
However necessary, the reforms to establish a market economy in Russia 
have created a certain "wild east" atmosphere, where bribery and blackmail 
are flourishing. Such conditions might be an advantage for western compa-
nies because of their- in Russian terms- vast capital resources," but the 
need for physical safety and sound financial principles probably by far 
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exceed the potential gains. Other acute problems, which the Barents trans-
border trade faces, are connected to what one could call the «time facton>: 
Low operating flexibility and a high risk rate require an extensive endur-
ance ability in order to defend a long-term investment in Russia. Huge 
disintegrating factory complexes also complicates foreign industrial 
involvement.60 Nevertheless, it is vital that western investors do not leave 
the impression in Russia that they command a certain Besserwissen, and 
thereby create negative reactions in a proud people. 61 Mr Vladimir V. 
Zhirinovskij's election victory for the nationalist Liberal Democrats in 
December 1993 gives an indication of the strength of such forces in Rus-
sia.62 
Economic cohesion is, of course, not merely dependent on finance. 
Also the political situation, regional infrastructure etc. play decisive roles 
in restructuring a national economy. However, the possibility of a closer 
linkage and improved access to a greater market is the main aim for the 
Barents counties in Russia. The EU, the EEA, and the PHARE states 
combined offer a market perspective that comprises approximately 450 
million people!" With an erosion of the nation-states and increasing 
regionalization, this vastly extended market may open hitherto unknown 
opportunities for Barents industries. 
The turmoil, which Russia is going through, allows for several authority 
conflicts to arise: After President Yeltsin announced the summary dissolu-
tion of the regional soviets, there was no reaction to this reassertion of the 
centre's authority- basically for two reasons: First, the regional governors, 
who are responsible to the president, but not all of whom support him, had 
as much as anyone to gain from the dissolution oflocal soviets, which were 
a source of constant trouble anyway. Second, these governors are waiting 
for President Yeltsin to tell the world through presidential decrees what 
kind of state he favours - a unitary state, as it used to be, a decentralized 
state, as it used to be in name, or a loose confederation, as many regional 
leaders would like it to be. Yeltsin has not abolished the federation council, 
the upper house of the new parliament, as he threatened to do before the 
1993 elections, and, thus, there exists a forum where the centre and the 
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regions can meet. Much is now dependent on whether the government can 
control the budget deficit and bring down inflation. 
The Advantage of Natural Resources 
The Barents and adjacent northern territories represent a tremendous lot of 
untapped resources. The northern areas of Russia, of which the Barents 
Region is a part, comprise the largest remaining territorial and environmen-
tal reserve ofthe country - and mankind in general. The geographic im-
mensity of unexploited resources by far surpasses the relatively small 
exploited and polluted areas. The high north is perhaps even more impor-
tant as a reserve of unoccupied and unspoilt areas than as a supplier ofraw 
materials and fuel. To illustrate the economic perspectives of the Barents 
Region, we will address some dominant industries - almost all offering 
great future opportunities. 
By 1991 crude oil extraction in the Russian high north, the basic 
national fuel and power supply area, had suffered a decline. One reason, 
among others, was insufficient iovestments.64 Russia relies heavily on the 
Arctic for the supply of fossil fuel resources to the extent that the Russian 
Arctic accounts for almost 2/3 of national oil and more than 60 percent of 
natural gas production. These percentages are bound to increase substan-
tially when the Arctic offshore production of oil and gas starts." 
A number of off-shore oil and gas fields in Russia and Norway are 
situated in the Barents Region. Since a future increase in EU imports of 
these products is primarily planned to come from Siberia, the North Sea, 
and the reserves in the Barents Sea, the European dimension of the Barents 
Region turns out to be quite strong in the energy field." 
The problem is that these opportunities occur amid administrative and 
economic chaos. The Barents Sea border controversy with Norway rnust be 
settled before off-shore production can speed up significantly. As soon as a 
border at sea is negotiated, there is reason to believe that the practical 
results will emerge in a couple of years. 
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The industrial production in the Barents Region does not represent any 
comparative advantage, on the contrary. Only cheap export of raw materi-
als can redress inefficiency in management and obsolete production meth-
ods. The present state of the mining industry complex is characterized by 
utilization of only the richest components of mineral deposits, mono-
product orientation, and low level of processing. However, scientific 
reports support the conclusion that northern Russia will remain the main 
world supplier of cobalt, diamonds, nickel, niobium, gold and phosphate 
for at least another twenty-five years." Furthermore, immediately adjacent 
areas, such as the Komi Republic to the east of the Barents Region," may 
contribute to the already strong regional mining industry if their export 
routes were connected to the Barents infrastructure. 
The opportunities that lie in the vast forests of the Archangel county 
probably offer the best business alternative for western investors during the 
early experimental stages of the Barents cooperation. In comparison to the 
western part of the region, the riches of Archangel represent a greater 
potential than the combined wood resources in Norden. These Barents 
resources may well be combined with the Nordic planting and marketing 
capacity and thus, from a Nordic point of view, provide stable raw material 
delivery which is important for the Nordic industry's very strong interna-
tional commitments." 
Like the oil industry the fishery sector, which is also concentrated at sea 
and thus outside the geographic borders of the region, is one of the indus-
tries with great future prospects. However, for the time being, lack of 
equipment control and quota supervision foster a somewhat underdevel-
oped fishing industry. If the region develops an off-shore dimension in the 
Barents Sea, the best environmental solution in the end, for most parties, 
might be some kind of fishery cartel built on the foundations of the Joint 
Russian-Norwegian Fishery Commission that already exists.70 As it is now, 
unorganized interest conflicts are emerging since some EU member states 
(Germany, Portugal and Spain) are already entering the Barents Sea 
without any inter-regional resource agreement in advance. 71 
DEFENCE STUDIES 2/1995 33 
The Prospects of Trade 
In a treaty-regulated market, the Russian Barents counties would probably 
be the ones to profit most from both intra- and inter-regional trade in the 
long run because of knowledge and technology transfers. The huge poten-
tial for economic development also favours the three Russian counties in 
terms of their function as a transit arena to the east (Northern Sea Route) or 
to the west by way of the Nordic countries. 
The trade potential of the Barents Region is somewhat hard to imagine, 
taking into account the meagre situation in 1987 when Eastern Europe and 
the USSR represented less than 2 percent of Norwegian exports. The 
USSR accounted for about 1/3 of that. At the same time Norwegian goods 
represented less than 0.5 percent of Soviet imports. But, because of the 
Barents initiative, the border is by now less of an "edge of economic 
differences". The old lesson that trade means peace - and vice versa - still 
seems to be plausible, but trade needs to be properly organized. 
In order to encourage intra-regional trade, several steps have been taken 
over the last two years. By a normal parliamentary decision, an Eastern 
Trade Centre (@sthandelssenter) was set up in Kirkenes in the spring of 
1992, cooperating with the Norwegian Export Council. In November the 
process continued with the establishment of a link between 
Nordhandelsforum, a unilateral organ for Norwegian trade in north western 
Russia, and the Working Group for Northern Trade which was the bilateral 
forum for trade between Russia and Norway. Further progress is likely to 
take place within the framework of the Barents institutions. In terms of 
exact financial support, the Norwegian Parliament has granted NOK 130 
million of the total NOK 351 million to Barents projects through its Eastern 
Europe programme." 
"Many of the newly established horizontal border regions share com-
mon historical, physical, economic and cultural features with adjacent 
regions in neighbouring states"." Critical voices have noted that the 
Barents initiative came too soon after the Cold War, developed too fast, 
and at a too high political level. Particularly because of the atypicalpolili-
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cal treatment received by the Barents Region, the region has the potential 
to strengthen its (relative) position through developing inter-regional 
alliances and networks towards, for instance, the Baltic region and the EU 
itself as well as minor regional entities within the EU. 
The similarities between the Barents and the Baltic regions are quite 
apparent. These are strategically very important and sensitive areas, and 
institutionally they resemble each other; the Barents Council mirrors the 
Baltic Sea Council. Even though the Regional (Barents) Council has no 
Baltic parallel, the trans-border, county-based structure is the same. The 
focus on history and the identity-building role played by the Pomor era is 
matched by the traditions of the Hanseatic League which was stronger 
based in terms of administrative organization. The talk of the so-called 
New Hansa points to some of the common aims of the 16th century trade 
organization and the new Baltic region, namely profit by an enlarged 
market and an extended common exploitation of the resource potentials. 74 
Most important is, of course, that both regions cross the former East-West 
divide. In addition both seek to create an economically oriented environ-
ment policy. They also try to pursue the EU to channel funds to environ-
mental programmes, which indirectly contributes to a harmonization to EU 
norms and standards. The required modernization in the former Soviet 
Union also needs such extra-regional investments to cope with environ-
mental challenges. In many ways the Barents Region represents a direct 
extension of similar initiatives farther south, particularly to the Baltic 
region. In any case they are both parts of a greater European mosaic. Only 
two months after the Copenhagen inauguration of the Baltic Sea Coopera-
tion the Barents idea was publicly mentioned for the first time, and the 
question is really whether the Barents initiative was an inspiration of, or a 
reaction to, the Baltic variant. A combination of the two explanations is 
probably the most plausible approach to the motivation for regionalization -
and it was indeed the Norwegian point of departure. If one keeps in mind 
that the Nordic relations with Germany are now quite similar to what they 
used to be before 1914 (ie strong), that the Baltic Sea is considerably closer 
to the EU than the Barents Sea, and that Germany, the key northern Euro-
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pean state, is more concerned about the Baltic Ostseeraum than the Barents 
Region, the outcome of a possible rivalry between the two should be pretty 
obvious. However, the Baltic cooperation cannot expand to comprise its 
Barents "counterpart" in economic and geographic terms anyway. 75 Seen 
through a pair of European glasses, what is important after all, is that the 
infrastructure connection from the Barents Region through the Baltic 
region to the EU (Via Baltica) ensures the inevitable inter-regional coop-
eration between the EU and the Baltic and Barents Regions. 
EU Regional Policies 
From the launching of the EU regional policy, ie the establishment of the 
European Regional Development Fund in 1975, to the creation of the 
structural funds through the Single European Act in 1985 and beyond, the 
funds' proportion of the EU annual budget has risen from an initial 5 
percent to 27 percent in 1992.76 At the Edinburgh summit the EU decided 
to spend 141 thousand million ECU on regional policy programmes before 
the end of 1998. The complex administration of these funds are more and 
more spread out because the immensity of the different programmes 
requires a broad supervisory approach: Three of the EU Commission's 
Directorates Generals (V, VI, and XVI) are directly involved in laying out 
the coordination of the structural funds. After heavy pressure from the 
German Bundesliinder the Maastricht summit set up a Committee of 
Regions to coordinate regional endeavours within the EU. Besides, a 
similar institution, the Nordic Committee for Senior Officials for Regional 
Policy (NERP), exists at the Nordic level.77 The latter could be used to gain 
economic resources for the Barents Region from EU-funds. In such a 
situation the Barents Council could appeal to the EU for financial support 
by conveying the idea that one should give priority to a trans-border region 
that also penetrates into the former Soviet Union as part ofEU policies 
towards Eastern Europe. 
The new trend, represented by cross-border regions, reflect the new 
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requirements of post Cold War world politics. The acute need for trust and 
communication channels, meeting places and arenas for information paves 
the way for an increasing number of regional institutions such as the 
Barents ones. A similar county-based body, resembling the Regional 
Council of the Barents Region has been proposed by Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev for the Baltic Region. Many of Europe's border areas share 
common historical, economic, geographical and cultural features with their 
neighbouring territories across the borders - and could easily gain from the 
adoption of regionalization strategies. Some of these regions have suffered 
from neglect and been regarded as buffer zones in stead of growth areas. 
The EU has for years taken certain measures to develop such regions. 
The EU strategy for regional, social and agricultural funds, which all 
together form the so-called structural funds, follow two basic principles: 
The classic common regional policy, which is financed partly by the EU 
budget and partly by each member state, constitutes the main pillar; the 
rules for competition and subvention represent other ways of regulating 
regional development. A set of rather detailed rules divides the different 
regions into categories in order to qualify for EU support. This is done by 
the use of a Nomenclature Unitaire Territoriale de Statistic (NUTS I, II, 
Ill), which divides the EU into three types of regions. Areas targeted as 
either NUTS I or NUTS III (ie the largest and smallest regions) may 
receive support through the EU regional funds. Six different objectives are 
then used to determine whether the region qualify for support - three of 
which are relevant in our case. Those are: objective I (underdeveloped 
areas, NUTS 1), objective 2 (decline of traditional industries, NUTS III), 
and objective 5b (rural areas, NUTS Ill). The Nordic counties which are 
members of both the European Union and the Barents Region, will qualifY 
for EU regional support. Farming under the label of"Arctic conditions" 
would also benefit from the structural funds. Anyway, the Barents Region 
comprises more than just regional development. It includes foreign policy 
and international trade policy, too. Norwegian authorities use it as the main 
framework for their contribution to the aid to the East. 
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As is the case with the Baltic region, the Barents cooperation is one of 
the first east-west regions to be realized within the framework of a new 
European order of more relaxed state borders, made possible by the fall of 
the iron curtain. The experience and expertise which the Barents institu-
tions are collecting may be of more long-term use to other regional projects 
in Central Europe. Consequently, the project will be followed with close 
attention by the EU Commission. If it fails, nobody will lift an eyebrow, 
but the failure might discourage similar projects elsewhere. On the other 
hand, if it succeeds, it may have a positive effect on the EU' s Eastern 
Europe relations in general- as an example to be followed. This is where 
the Barents Region becomes important in an all-European perspective. 
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Co1111c~udilllg Assessme1111t of the 1Bare1111ts 
Regio1111 IPmject 
Generally, the Barents Region now rests upon three integrated pillars, 
which all represent processes that started after the end of the Cold War. 
Through normalization of the East-West relations one aims to establish 
connections between the Nordic countries and Russia similar to the bonds 
between the Nordic countries and Western Europe. Another strategy is to 
promote regional stabilization by reducing economic, environmental and 
military threats in the area. Finally, one should note that regiona/ization is 
used to create a multilateral cooperation framework where the Barents 
Region has been positioned in relation to the broader European political 
development. This remains important, although the Norwegian no-vote on 
28 November 1994 in the referendum about membership in the European 
Union, has somewhat weakened the Norwegian potential in this respect 
and created some uncertainty about the future. 
Geopolitical Dimensions 
The Barents initiative carne from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs as a result of the search for a combined solution to the economic, 
environmental and security relations to Russia and the EU, combined with 
the need for further development in northern Norway. The project was in a 
way meant to be a Norwegian contribution to the establishment of a new 
arrangement for European cooperation and security. The intention was to 
create a framework for solving the multidimensional security and environ-
mental challenges as well as to exploit the economic opportunities in the 
high north based on a Norwegian-Russian axis with an anchorage in the 
east, the west and the south. The intention was, in other words, to weave a 
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network that would promote stability and cooperation as opposed to the 
militarization of the area. 
The idea of a Barents Region in many ways signalled the biggest 
change in Norwegian foreign policy since the state joined NATO in 1949. 
The realization of the idea was done on Norwegian initiative partly because 
of altered strategic conditions and partly because of general interest in 
reinforcing "an open society" and economic reforms in Russia. The new 
strategic situation implies that the Barents Region is the only east-west 
region in Europe where Russia meets the West, except for the St. 
Petersburg area within the Baltic Sea Cooperation. Because Russia is now 
more of a regional rather than a global power, it has become more impor-
tant than ever to avoid any further turmoil within the giant, unstable 
neighbour to the east of the border. If low politics could have a spillover 
effect on high politics in terms of security interests, nothing would be more 
welcome to the Barents initiators. After all, the economic profit potential 
was not the most important motivation. Many observers have pointed out 
that the Barents Region would soon be dead without proper security 
guarantees from outside actors. As the military's influence in north western 
Russia may continue for years, this question will probably be found higher 
and higher on the Barents agenda. Because of Norway's singular position 
in the north and decreasing American military support, the need for secu-
rity is more a Norwegian than a Russian concern. No one can know exactly 
what happens if the Russian reform process suffers a setback. 
Political innovation and pursuit of regional friendship are the only 
methods of reaching results and of cooperating in order to use the new 
opportunities. Especially for Norway, which failed to become a member of 
the EU, positive results of the Barents cooperation will be increasingly 
important. The Barents Region can in some respects help heal the damage 
of a split Norden. As for EU regional funds, some of which have become 
unobtainable, the initiative is very much in the hands of the Swedish and 
Finnish governments. Russia is at the moment more fenced in than ever - at 
least in this century. Both Norway and Russia are now peripheral states. 
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Final Paradoxes 
The most puzzling and fascinating dynamics concerning the Barents 
Region are represented by the issues that are not yet incorporated in the 
regional cooperation: Matters of military security and sovereignty at sea are 
not at all dealt with in the Kirkenes Declaration. Furthermore, the opportu-
nities of the petroleum and the fishery industries in particular are on one's 
mind when it comes to the Barents Sea border negotiations. 
There are also differences in interests among the Barents partners. The 
Russian motivations are first and foremost economic, whereas the Nordic 
incentives are predominantly stability in terms of environmental safety and 
regional security. In this respect it is no paradox that "unity in diversity" 
could be a slogan for the Barents Region. The final test of the region's 
durability as a viable political instrument will probably arrive after the EO-
Norden relations have been more specifically clarified. 
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1 The Vizegrad initiative refers to an agreement between Poland, Hungary and 
The Czech Republic. The cooperation has a political- rather than economic-
character. 
2 In his foreign policy speech in Parliament on 19th January 1993 Foreign 
Afinister Stoltenberg indicated quite explicitly that Kare/ia would become a 
member of the Regional Council at a later stage. 
3 Governor Erling Flo/len of Finnmark County was originally sceptical towards 
letting the Karelians join the Barents region on the grounds that the republic 
was geographically situated too far to the south. Air. Flatten- among others-
later changed his mind after a visit to Petrozavodsk (= Petroskoi = Aiinis!inna 
= Onegaborg), the capital of the republic, because of the greater degree of 
independent decision-making procedures one hopes to face in the case of 
Karelia (Interview 30th August1993). 
4 The fact that security concerns is a very important underlying factor in the 
Barents co-opera/ion has been emphasized in both speeches by Th. Stoltenberg 
and talks that the author has had with politicians and civil servants (cf fist of 
sources). 
'CfCastberg & Stokke 1992; St. meld. /992-93b; Stokke /994. 
6 Aftenpostcn, /3 March /993,p. 10. 
7 Cf Moe 1992: /2-15; Castberg & Stokke 1992:20; St. meld. /992-93b:48. 
'CfCastberg & Stokke 1992 p.8. 
9 According to Focus (13/1 993) 18% of the tests in the Soviet Union took place 
on Novaya Zemlya: 131 (90 atmospheric and 41 underground) out of a total 
number of713. 
10 CJSkorve & Skogan 1992 p./3. 
11 Aftenposten, 13 A/arch 1993, p. 10, and 1 June 1993, p. 4. The environmental 
organization Bellona has also repeatedly reported on the projected storage. 
12 The International Herald Tribune (3-4 Apri/1993) refers to a Russian 
governmental report, which states that the most significant threat comes from 
the dumping of reactors from submarines ice-breakers and other seagoing 
vessels. See also Cast berg & Stokke /992:36[46-47; Hauge eta/. !992:7. 
13 The information which is used in this sub-chapter is based on informal 
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interviews and is, therefore, problematic to cover with direct references. 
u Other institutes were also involved: The Nordic Sami Institute and the 
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment were among the contributors. An 
expert conference was held. 
JJ .Air Jerve/1 wrote an extensive internal report (117 pages) on the Barents 
project. 
16 Those, who took part in the seminar, were former Director General Einar 
Ansteensen, Head of Division Lars Fure, Assistant Director General Sverre 
Jeve/1, A.mbassador Dagjinn Stenseth and Foreign .Minister Thorvald 
Stoltenberg. 
17 For instance, }.finister of Defence J. J. Holst and Afinister of Agriculture G. 
@yangen were consulted in advance. 
18 Some critical voices were registered among members of the Left Socialist 
Party because of the region's European/ink. The critics were heavily attacked 
by the foreign minister, asking where their call for co-operation with the 
Eastern countries had gone. 
19 Some scepticism towards the Barents region still e..Yists in the Russian foreign 
office (illlen•iew with Embassy Counsellor Rozanov). The main problem on the 
Russian side is that too few people are engaged in the Bare Ills work in the 
foreign minislt)l. 
2° Fear of becoming involved in covering the enormous environmental clean-up 
costs restrained the US. authorities from being among the signatories. 
u State Secretary Helga Hernes (who was somewhat sceptical to the project), 
Political Secretaries Dag Terje Andersen and Nils Asbjorn Engstad were all 
involved in this work. 
"Cf Stortingsforhandlingcr (1992-93), pp. 2491-2420. Mr. Chaffey's inquiry 
was presented during the questioning hour on 20th January 1993. His party did 
not oppose the Barents region, although local LSP activists in Northern Norway 
argued against it in several newspaper articles. 
"Nordlys, 15 March 1993. 
"St.prp. nr. 80 (1991-92): Om utbygging av Norgcs samarbeid med 
reformlandene i 0st and St.prp. nr. 74 (1992-93): Om plan for samarbeid med 
Sentral- og 0st-Europa samt SUS-Iandene og i Barentsregionen. 
"CJ Pedersen 1993:14. 
"Cf Archer 1990: 165; Young 1993:36,39-40. 
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'' CfSt.meld. 1992-93b:32,46. 
"CfBuzan eta/. 1990:220. 
29 Common categorization used eg by DG XVI (Regional Policies) of the EU 
Commission. 
'"CJVeggeland 1992a:29. 
31 To pursue thiS particular purpose and to work towards further regionalizaton 
an interest organi=ation, The Assemb~v of European Regions (AER), has beeen 
established. 
31 Professor James Mayall at the London School of Economics emphasized the 
negative efficts of such, what he called, undemocratic behaviour (Interview 7 
August 1993). 
33 At the party congress April 28- 29 1993 this aspect was strongly emphasized 
in Resolution No. 5: "The Barents Cooperatiom>. 
J.t The Committee of Regions was formally set up in the provisions of the Treaty 
of the European Union (Jtlaastriclzt Treaty}. For further details confer Articles 
J98a-c of the treaty (Part Five, Title I, Section 5, Chapter 4). This point was 
emphisi:::ed by former Foreign Afinister Holst at the Barents seminar in Dct 
norskc Vidcnskapsakademi, 3rd November 1993. 
"CJSt.tid. 1992-93:2419-2420. 
"CJCastberg /992b:6f 
1
' A television programme ('Rysslands oklinda hOrn'} on the Swedish TV2 
channel (I September 1993) suggested that the people who live in the :::ones 
which are governed by the military actually prefer military to civilian rule 
because it protects them against the frightening realities of the crime rate in 
Russia. 
38 Cf Holst 1990a:9. 
"CfTamnes 1990:13. 
"CJKozyrev 1993:5-6. 
41 This specific term stems from speeches held by Dr. S. Lodgaard. 
-n Cf Article J..f in the Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy of 
the Afaastricht Treaty. 
41 For instance, Nordic co-operation has functioned very well in the UN and in 
relation to the SADCC countries. 
"CfVrerno 1993:159. 
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.tJ This particular Finnish effort was known as the Great Calotte. There were 
also other options; an extension of the Baltic region to the north was considered 
at one point. 
46 Cf article in the Northern Norwegiat1 newspaper Finnmarkcn on 24 May 
1993, p. 5. 
47 Cf Joenniemi 1992:3. 
411 Even though the number of inhabitants in this case does probab{v not give a 
proper indication, the country's proportion of the total population of the Baltic 
region is a mere 1 7.1% (Veggeland & Hedegaard 1993: /36). 
49 CfNeumann !992a:86; Va!rno 1993:79. 
so CfTunander 1989:17. 
51 The various border alternatives and Russian and Norwegian preferences are 
discussed in greater detail in Fleischer, C. A. (1984): Folkcrctt, Oslo: 
Universitetsforlagel. See a/sa Holst, J. J. & Heradsveit, D. (eds.) (1985): Norsk 
ulcnrikspolilikk, Oslo: TANO. 
"CfTresse/t/988:80. 
"CJHod /993:5. 
54 Stated by State Secretary S. Bjerke at the PETRO '93 Conference on 2nd 
September 1993 in Harstad. 
55 CJSkogan/993b:49. 
56 CfRoginko 1993:25. 
57 Stated by Embassy Counsellor Vadim Ro::anov, Embassy of the Russian 
Federation, Oslo. Technical expertise and banking/finance institutions, which 
are available on short notice, enhance the important role of the vicinal Nordic 
counties. 
511 Stated by sources at the EU delegation in Oslo. 
59 Confirmed by Embassy Counsellor V Rozanov, Embassy of the Russian 
Federation, Oslo. 
"CJSt.prp. 741992-93:11. 
"CJKjo/berg 1993:12-13. 
6~ international Herald Tribune, 15 December 1993, pp. 1-2. 
"CfDo/viketa/.1991:46. 
"CfCheredeev 1992:124. 
"CJRoginko 1993:26. 
DEFENCE STUDIES 2/1995 45 
46 
"CJVegge/and & f!edegaard 1993:101. 
"CJCheredeev 1992:123. 
"
8 Cf articles in Aftenposten, 8-9 December 1993. 
"C[St.meld. 42 1992-93:52. 
'"CJflae/1992:4. 
71 Dagens Na:ringsliv, 30 November /993, p. 16. 
72 Press release no. 206193, Royal Afinistry of Foreign "'1.jfairs. 
73 CJVegge/and & f!edegaard 1993:128. 
74 Cf Joenniemi & Wrever 1992:9; Skaaning 1990:4. 
'
5 In an interview with the author, this view was expressed by Mr F Thiollier, 
Deputy Head of the EU delegation, Oslo. 
"C[Forse/11991:41; Randa !993:5-6,10. 
"CJVeggeland & fledegaard 1993:128. 
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